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GNSS Signal Authentication via Power and
Distortion Monitoring
Kyle D. Wesson, Member, IEEE, Jason N. Gross, Member, IEEE, Todd E. Humphreys, Member, IEEE, and
Brian L. Evans, Fellow, IEEE
Abstract—We propose a simple low-cost technique that enables
civil Global Positioning System (GPS) receivers and other civil
global navigation satellite system (GNSS) receivers to reliably
detect carry-off spoofing and jamming. The technique, which
we call the Power-Distortion detector, classifies received signals
as interference-free, multipath-afflicted, spoofed, or jammed
according to observations of received power and correlation
function distortion. It does not depend on external hardware or
a network connection and can be readily implemented on many
receivers via a firmware update. Crucially, the detector can with
high probability distinguish low-power spoofing from ordinary
multipath. In testing against over 25 high-quality empirical data
sets yielding over 900,000 separate detection tests, the detector
correctly alarms on all malicious spoofing or jamming attacks
while maintaining a <0.5% single-channel false alarm rate.
Index Terms—satellite navigation systems, Global Positioning
System, Global Navigation Satellite Systems, navigation security,
GNSS spoofing, GNSS jamming
I. INTRODUCTION
GNSS receivers are tremendously popular in navigationand timing applications due to their accuracy, low cost,
and global operation. Low cost can be credited to the fact
that civil GNSS signals are defined in freely-available, open-
access standards [1], [2], which makes receiver develop-
ment straightforward. But an open-access standard, together
with civil GNSS signals’ near-perfect predictability, invites
forgery: receivers can fall victim to spoofing attacks in which
counterfeit GNSS signals fool the receiver into reporting a
hazardously misleading position or time [3]. The vulnera-
bility of civil GNSS receivers to spoofing is a serious risk
for GNSS-dependent critical infrastructure and safety-of-life
applications [4], [5].
GNSS authentication techniques can be broadly categorized
into three groups: (1) cryptographic techniques that exploit
unpredictable but verifiable signal modulation in the GNSS
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spreading code or navigation data, (2) geometric techniques
that exploit the angle-of-arrival diversity of authentic GNSS
signals, and (3) GNSS signal processing techniques that do
not fall into categories (1) or (2). A comprehensive survey of
GNSS authentication techniques is offered in [6].
Cryptographic signal authentication is effective [6]–[8], but,
despite recent interest and engagement by U.S. and European
satellite navigation agencies [9], [10], no open civil GNSS
signals yet incorporate cryptographic modulation. Moreover,
it has become clear that financial and technical hurdles will
impede development and implementation of such modulation
for years to come. It is possible to leverage the existing
encryption of military GNSS signals for civil signal authenti-
cation [11], but this technique requires the protected receiver
to be connected to a data network, an undesirable dependency
that prevents stand-alone operation.
Authentication techniques that exploit GNSS signals’ geo-
metric diversity can also be highly effective. These include
angle-of-arrival discrimination techniques based on multiple
antennas [12]–[15], or a single antenna experiencing oscilla-
tory motion [16], or a single antenna with multiple feeds [17].
The drawback of these approaches is their reliance on multiple
antennas, antenna motion, or an assumption that interference
signals arrive from below the antenna’s horizon. Likewise,
methods that require coupling with inertial sensors [18], [19]
or vision sensors may prove impractical in applications with
cost, size, weight, or power constraints.
Practical near-term GNSS signal authentication techniques
are those that do not require changes to GNSS signals-in-
space, are receiver-autonomous, low-cost, require no addi-
tional hardware, and can be implemented via a software or
firmware update. Recognizing the value of techniques that fall
into this category, previous work has proposed monitoring the
total received power via the Automatic Gain Control (AGC)
setpoint [20], and monitoring autocorrelation profile distor-
tion [21]–[23]. But when acting separately these techniques
are unreliable for signal authentication. A received power
monitor that ignores correlation distortion may not detect a
low-power spoofer. Moreover, because a power-monitoring-
only technique does not distinguish between spoofing and
jamming, its alarm rate can become intolerable in urban areas
where so-called personal privacy devices (PPDs, small GNSS
jammers) [24] are common. For their part, the distortion-
monitoring approaches in [21]–[23] ignore total received
power, and thus can be fooled by a spoofer transmitting with a
significant power advantage over the authentic signals, which,
by action of the AGC, forces the authentic signals under the
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noise floor, leaving a distortion-free correlation function [8].
A GNSS authentication technique is needed that is both
practical in the sense described above and reliable at detecting
spoofing. To this end, we propose to combine the elemental
tests mentioned earlier, namely, detection of anomalous re-
ceived power and detection of correlation profile distortion, in
a GNSS signal authentication technique we call the Power-
Distortion detector, or PD detector for short. The key insight
behind our approach is this: The practically-unavoidable in-
teraction between authentic and spoofed GNSS signals during
the initial stages of a tracking-points-carry-off spoofing attack
makes such spoofing evident, with high probability, in received
power or signal distortion or both. If a carry-off-type spoofer
transmits at a low signal power, the attack will either be inef-
fective or will cause significant correlation function distortion
as the similarly-sized spoofing and authentic signals interact.
On the other hand, if a spoofer transmits at a high signal
power, the correlation function may be distortion-free but
the receiver’s total received power will be anomalously high.
Our proposed technique traps a would-be spoofer between
simultaneous measurements of received power and correlation
function distortion. Provided the spoofer is unable to block
or otherwise null the authentic GNSS signals impinging on
the receiver’s antenna (a difficult task if the receiver enjoys
a physical security perimeter [6]), the combination of these
measurements within a Bayesian detection framework poses a
formidable defense against carry-off-type spoofing.
This paper, a significant extension of our work in [25],
makes three main contributions. First, it introduces a novel
technique for detecting GNSS jamming and carry-off-type
spoofing and rigorously develops the measurement models
and probability distributions required to characterize the detec-
tion statistic. Second, it presents a Monte-Carlo-type method
for determining the Bayes-optimal decision rule and offers
detailed consideration of the requisite cost function. Third,
it presents a thorough evaluation of the proposed technique
against three realistic data sets: (1) the Texas Spoofing Test
Battery [26]–[28], a public set of GPS spoofing recordings;
(2) the RNL Multipath and Interference Recordings [29], [30],
a public set of deep urban GNSS recordings with significant
multipath; and (3) a set of recordings of GNSS signals subject
to jamming.
II. SIGNAL MODELS
A. Pre-Correlation Model
Consider the following generic representation of an authen-
tic GNSS signal exiting a receiver’s radio frequency (RF)
front-end downconversion chain. For notational compactness,
the signal is expressed by its complex baseband representation,
rA(t) =
√
PAD(t− τA)Cr(t− τA) exp(jθA) (1)
where t is time in seconds, PA is the received power of
the authentic signal in Watts, D(t) is the ±1-valued naviga-
tion data modulation, Cr(t) is the ±1-valued pseudorandom
spreading (ranging) code, τA is the code phase in seconds, and
exp(jθA) is the carrier with phase θA in radians. PA, τA, and
θA are assumed to vary with time; their time dependency is
suppressed for notational simplicity. Without loss of generality
for the purposes of this paper, the navigation data modulation
D(t) can be ignored; hence, hereafter we assume D(t) = 1.
Let rI(t) represent a single complex-valued interference
signal that is structurally identical to rA(t). This could be
a multipath, spoofing, or jamming signal. If multipath, rI(t)
represents the strongest reflection at time t, whose effect
on received power and correlation function distortion is a
good proxy for that of the aggregate multipath. If jamming,
rI(t) represents structured-signal jamming, an especially po-
tent form of jamming similar to spoofing except there is no
expected correlation between the jamming signal’s code or
carrier phase and those of rA(t) [31]. The interference signal
is modeled as
rI(t) =
√
ηPACr(t− τI) exp(jθI) (2)
where η = PI/PA is the interference signal’s power advantage
relative to the authentic signal, and τI and θI are the interfer-
ence signal’s code and carrier phase, respectively.
To complete the received signal model, let
rN(t) = N(t) +M(t) (3)
be a white zero-mean complex-valued Gaussian process that
models the sum of thermal noise N(t), with constant spectral
density N0, and multi-access interferenceM(t), with variable
spectral density M0. The two noise components are assumed
to be independent so that rN(t) has densityN0+M0.M(t) ac-
counts for the noise contribution from other legitimate GNSS
signals besides the desired signal (collectively called multi-
access signals), and any interference accompanying these.
With the addition of rN(t), the full received signal-plus-
interference-and-noise model is given by
r(t) = rA(t) + rI(t) + rN(t) (4)
As shown in Fig. 1, an AGC circuit is assumed to apply
a scaling factor β(t) to r(t) so that the power in the scaled
signal β(t)r(t) remains constant. Subsequent to AGC scaling,
the signal is quantized and encoded; for simplicity, these
operations are ignored in Fig. 1 and in the remainder of this
paper, as their effects on the this paper’s detection processing
are negligible.
At the core of GNSS signal processing is correlation of
β(t)r(t) with a local replica
ℓ(t, τ) = Cℓ(t− τˆ − τ) exp(jθˆ)
where τ is an arbitrary code phase lag in seconds and Cℓ(t)
is the local code replica, which, ignoring the effects of band-
limiting on the received signal, is often made equal to Cr(t).
The goal of a receiver’s code and carrier tracking loops is to
drive the estimates τˆ and θˆ to match τA and θA as accurately
as possible. In practice, however, τˆ and θˆ track the code and
carrier phase of the composite signal r(t), not just those of
rA(t).
B. Post-Correlation Model
Correlation and accumulation over an interval T ending at
time tk = kT , k ∈ {1, 2, ...} produce the complex-valued
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`(t; τ) = C`(t− τ^ − τ) exp(jθ^)
*
1
T
R tk
tk−1
(·)dt
tk = kT
ξk(τ) = Ik(τ) + jQk(τ) to tracking
loops
r(t)
β(t)
AGC
β(t)r(t)
Fig. 1: Block diagram of the standard AGC, correlation, and accumulation operations in a GNSS receiver. The product of the
AGC-scaled incoming signal β(t)r(t) and the conjugate of the local replica ℓ(t, τ) is accumulated over T seconds to produce
the discrete complex-valued accumulation product ξk(τ). For notational convenience, the accumulation product has been scaled
by 1/T .
accumulation product ξk, which, when viewed as a function
of the arbitrary lag τ introduced by the local replica ℓ(t, τ),
is called the receiver’s correlation function for signal rA(t) at
time tk, and is modeled as [32]
ξk(τ) = βk[ξAk(τ) + ξIk(τ) + ξNk(τ)] (5)
where βk is the average value of β(t) over the kth accumula-
tion interval, and ξAk(τ), ξIk(τ), ξNk(τ) are the complex cor-
relation function components corresponding to the authentic
signal, the interference signal, and thermal noise, respectively.
Fig. 2 illustrates such a correlation function.
I
τ
θ
ξAk(τ)
ξIk(τ)
jξk(τ)j
τ
Magnitude Plot
E
P L
Q
I
Q
I{Q Plot
θ
ξAk
ξIk
0
0
Fig. 2: Components of the correlation function ξk(τ) for
an example scenario with a triangular-shaped R(τ) and a
strong spoofing or multipath interference component ξIk(τ).
For visual clarity, the thermal noise component ξNk(τ) is not
shown. The upper-right inset shows the phase angle of the
authentic and interference components relative to the in-phase
I and quadrature Q components of the local replica ℓ(t, τ).
The lower-left inset shows the magnitude of the composite
correlation function ξk(τ), which is clearly distorted by the
interference component. E, P , and L mark the early, prompt,
and late correlation taps, respectively. The local replica’s code
phase estimate τˆ attempts to track the code phase of the
composite signal r(t) by equalizing E and L. The prompt
tap P is located at τ = 0.
The function R(τ) = E[Cr(t)Cℓ(t − τ)], often called the
autocorrelation function of Cr(t) even though, strictly speak-
ing, Cℓ(t) may be slightly different from Cr(t), approximates
the interaction between Cr(t) and Cℓ(t) over the correlation
and accumulation operations:
R(τ) ≈ 1
T
∫ tk
tk−1
Cr(t)Cℓ(t− τ)dt
The correlation components ξAk(τ) and ξIk(τ) can be modeled
in terms of R(τ) as
ξAk(τ) =
√
PAkR(−∆τAk + τ) exp(j∆θAk)
ξIk(τ) =
√
ηkPAkR(−∆τIk + τ) exp(j∆θIk)
where PAk and ηk are the average values of PA and η over the
accumulation interval, and ∆τAk is the average value of the
difference τA− τˆ over the accumulation interval, with similar
definitions for ∆τIk , ∆θAk, and ∆θIk.
The thermal noise component of the correlation function,
ξNk(τ), is modeled as having independent in-phase (real) and
quadrature (imaginary) components, each modeled as a zero-
mean Gaussian white discrete-time process:
E[R{ξNk(ρ)}I{ξNj(ν)}] = 0 ∀ ρ, ν, k ̸= j
The chip interval of the spreading code Cr(t), denoted τc,
ranges from 0.01 to 1 µs in modern GNSS signals. Due to the
pseudorandom nature of Cr(t), only samples of ξNk(τ) within
2τc of each other are correlated [33]:
E[ξNk(ρ)ξ
∗
Nk(ν)] =
{
2σ2N(1− |ρ− ν|/τc) |ρ− ν| ≤ 2τc
0 |ρ− ν| > 2τc
Here, ∗ denotes the complex conjugate and σ2N is the variance
of the in-phase and quadrature components of ξNk(τ), which
is related to the spectral density of the white noise process
rN(t) by σ2N = (N0 +M0)/2T .
III. HYPOTHESIS TESTING FRAMEWORK
We adopt a Bayesian M-ary hypothesis testing framework
[34, Ch. 2] for distinguishing between hypotheses Hi, i ∈ I,
where I = {0, 1, 2, 3}. The null hypothesis H0 corresponds
to the interference-free case, and Hi, i = 1, 2, 3 correspond
respectively to multipath, spoofing, and jamming.
The foregoing signal models reveal three parameters rele-
vant to choosing between hypotheses, namely, the interference
power advantage η, and the interference-to-authentic code and
carrier offsets ∆τ ! τI − τA and ∆θ ! θI − θA. Let these be
combined into a single vector θ = [η,∆τ,∆θ]T assumed to lie
in the parameter space Λ, itself divided into disjoint parameter
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sets Λi ⊂ Λ, i ∈ I, each associated with its corresponding
hypothesis Hi. Thus, deciding that θ ∈ Λi is equivalent to
choosing hypothesis Hi. Note that, because θ can take on a
range of values, the hypothesis testing problem is composite.
In a Bayesian formulation of the composite hypothesis
testing problem, the parameter vector θ is viewed as a random
quantity, Θ, having density w(θ), with πi ! P (Θ ∈ Λi) being
the prior probability that Θ falls in Λi. We denote by wi(θ)
the conditional density of Θ given that Θ ∈ Λi; it follows that
wi(θ) =
{
0 θ /∈ Λi
w(θ)/πi θ ∈ Λi
We propose to decide between the four hypotheses based
on two types of observation at each tk, namely, the received
power measurement Pk and the symmetric difference mea-
surement Dk, both detailed in a later section. The observation
vector zk = [Dk, Pk]T , which resides in the observation
set Γ, is modeled as a random variable Zk with conditional
density p(zk|θ). Hi can be defined as the hypothesis that Zk
is distributed as p(zk|Θ ∈ Λi), i ∈ I.
A decision rule δ(zk) is a partition of Γ into disjoint
decision regions Γi, i ∈ I, such that Hi is chosen when
zk ∈ Γi:
δ(zk) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
0 if zk ∈ Γ0
1 if zk ∈ Γ1
2 if zk ∈ Γ2
3 if zk ∈ Γ3
Let C[i, θ] be the cost of choosing Hi when θ ∈ Λ is the
actual parameter vector. Note that this function is sensitive
to a particular value of θ, which makes it more general than
one that simply assigns a unform cost for choosing Hi when
θ ∈ Λj . A later section will introduce various embodiments
of C[i, θ].
An optimum rule selects the least costly hypothesis, on
average, given the observation zk. More precisely, if we define
the conditional risk, or the average cost for Θ = θ, as
Rθ(δ) ! Eθ {C[δ(Zk), θ]} , θ ∈ Λ
where Eθ denotes expectation assuming Zk ∼ p(zk|θ), and if
we define average, or Bayes, risk as
r(δ) = E[RΘ(δ)] (6)
where the expectation is now taken over the random quantity
Θ, then the optimum rule δ is the one whose decision regions
Γi, i ∈ I, minimize r(δ).
To find the minimizing δ, each parameter set Λi and
conditional distribution wi(θ) must be defined for i ∈ I.
These could be approximated from an extensive campaign
of empirical multipath, spoofing, and jamming data collection
and analysis. But any empirical characterization runs the risk
of biasing the Λi and wi(θ) toward the particular dataset used.
This is merely a restatement of Hume’s problem of induc-
tion: metaphorically speaking, the empirical dataset may only
contain white swans [35]. To avoid this pitfall of inference,
which, in a security context, could be a serious vulnerability,
the following definitions of Λi and wi(θ) are informed not
only by observation but also by the physical characteristics
and limitations of signals under the various hypotheses.
H0: No interference
In what follows, we denote the marginal distributions of
wi(θ) by wηi(x), w∆τ i(x), and w∆θi(x), i ∈ I. Under the
null hypothesis (i = 0), which corresponds to the interference-
free case, we have
Λ0 = {θ ∈ Λ | η = 0}
It follows that wη0(x) is equivalent to the Dirac delta function.
The marginal distributions w∆τ0(x), and w∆θ0(x) can be
defined arbitrarily, since for η = 0 they have no effect on
r(δ).
H1: Multipath
In the case of multipath, η and ∆τ can be bounded as
follows:
Λ1 = {θ ∈ Λ | 0 < η < η1, 0 < ∆τ < ∆τ1}
The bounds η1 and ∆τ1 are informed by the physics of signal
reception and signal processing, as follows. Whenever the
authentic signal is unobstructed, it arrives with greater power
than any echo, whose additional path length and interaction
with reflection surfaces invariably attenuate its power [36].
Moreover, an echo whose delay is more than double the
spreading code chip interval (e.g., more than 0.2 µs for
τc = 0.1 µs) causes no correlation function distortion [33],
and, due to the additional path loss, is at least 3 dB weaker
than an unobstructed authentic signal [37]. Thus, its effect on
r(δ) is negligible. It follows that η1 = 1 and ∆τ1 = 2τc
upper-bound the multipath parameter set for an unobstructed
authentic signal.
On the other hand, the severe shadowing experienced by
mobile receivers can cause η > 1, especially in urban environ-
ments where surrounding buildings simultaneously attenuate
and reflect authentic signals [37]. In these situations, there is
no practical upper limit on η because the direct-path authentic
signal may be attenuated by 50 dB or more. It is not possible
to reliably distinguish multipath from low-power spoofing in
such circumstances.
One can avoid this difficulty by applying this paper’s
detection test only when the authentic signal rA(t) is received
without severe shadowing, in which case the probability that
η > 1 under H1 again becomes negligible. In particular,
the multipath model developed below assumes that rA(t) is
attenuated less than 6 dB by shadowing. In practice, one
simply excludes cases in which the received power Pk is not
unusually high yet the measured carrier-to-noise ratio C/N0
drops by more than 6 dB from its modeled value for an
unobstructed authentic signal.
An analysis of GNSS multipath was carried out to validate
the bounds η1 = 1 and ∆τ1 = 2τc and to characterize w1(θ).
The analysis was based on the Land Mobile Satellite Channel
Model (LMSCM) [38], itself based on extensive experimenta-
tion with a wideband airborne transmitter at GNSS frequencies
in urban and suburban environments [37], [38]. The LMSCM
generates power, delay, and carrier phase for both line-of-sight
and echo signals using deterministic models for attenuation,
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diffraction, and delay that respond to stochastically-generated
obstacles and reflectors in the simulation environment.
In keeping with the philosophy of robust detection, mul-
tipath scenarios were sought whose distribution w1(θ) was
most similar to the distribution for spoofing, w2(θ). From the
standpoint of distinguishing multipath from spoofing, this is
the worst-case w1(θ). As a practical matter, the worst-case
w1(θ) has a high proportion of large η values and a wide
range of ∆θ. Not surprisingly, urban LMSCM scenarios with
low-elevation satellite signals yielded the worst-case w1(θ).
For flexibility of detector design, the simulation-derived
w1(θ) was parameterized in terms of satellite elevation angle
αe. Several 1-minute LMSCM simulations with randomly-
created urban environments and various satellite azimuth an-
gles were run for αe ∈ [20, 80] degrees. At each simulation
epoch, the maximum-amplitude echo was identified and its
relative power, delay, and phase with respect to the line-of-
sight signal were taken as sampled η, ∆τ , and ∆θ values from
which w1(θ) could be approximated. Epochs whose line-of-
sight signal was attenuated by more than 6 dB were excluded,
resulting in exclusion of up to 90% of epochs for heavily-
shadowed scenarios at αe = 20, but less than 1% of epochs at
αe = 80. At each αe, the scenario producing the worst-case
w1(θ) was selected.
A statistical analysis of the sampled η, ∆τ , and ∆θ values
revealed that the relative phase ∆θ was uniformly distributed
on [0, 2π) and independent of η, ∆τ , which is unsurprising
given the wavelength-scale sensitivity of ∆θ to path length.
The parameters η and ∆τ were found to be significantly
correlated, with a linear correlation coefficient of approxi-
mately ρ = −0.23, implying that more distant reflectors tend
to produce weaker echos. Consistent with [36], the marginal
distribution wη1(x) was found to be log-normal, with a mean
of −21 dB and a standard deviation of 5 dB, both insensitive
to αe. Thus, excluding cases of heavy line-of-sight signal
shadowing, multipath causes η > 1 with negligible probability,
which indicates that η1 = 1 is an unproblematic bound. The
marginal distribution w∆τ1(x) was found to be exponential,
w∆τ1(x) = µ
−1e−x/µ, x ≥ 0
with µ a quadratic function of αe,
µ = 0.012α2e − 2.4αe + 134
where αe is expressed in degrees and ∆τ in nanoseconds.
Thus, ∆τ values are widely spread at low αe but tightly
clustered near zero at high αe, consistent with the empirical
distributions in [37].
H2: Spoofing
Under the spoofing hypothesis, we take η1 = 1 as a lower
bound for η and assume |∆τ | is upper-bounded by∆τ1 = 2τc:
Λ2 = {θ ∈ Λ | η1 ≤ η, 0 < |∆τ | < ∆τ1}
These bounds make sense because the spoofing signal must
be at least as powerful as the authentic signal for reliable
spoofing, and because spoofing whose |∆τ | value exceeds
∆τ1 = 2τc is no longer classified as carry-off-type spoofing,
since the interference is uncorrelated with the authentic signal.
Instead, for |∆τ | ≥ ∆τ1, the attack is classified as jamming.
For maximum stealth, the distribution w2(θ) should be as
close as possible to w1(θ) while respecting the bounds η1
and ∆τ1 and allowing a wide range of ∆τ for code pull-off.
Thus, wη2(x) is modeled as log-normal with mean of 1 dB and
standard deviation a fraction of a dB, w∆τ2(x) as exponential
with parameter µ = 120 (mimicking low-elevation multipath),
and w∆θ2(x) as uniform on [0, 2π).
H3: Jamming
Because it is uncorrelated with the authentic signal, jam-
ming is taken to have |∆τ | ≥ ∆τ1 = 2τc. Its power advantage
is assumed to be at least η1 = 1, as weaker jamming is both
harmless and so common as to be unremarkable. Thus, the
jamming parameter set is
Λ3 = {θ ∈ Λ | η1 ≤ η,∆τ1 ≤ |∆τ |}
The marginal distribution wη3(x) is taken to be Rician. By
adjusting the Rician distance and scale parameters ν and σ,
one can model high- or low-power jamming within a wide
or narrow range. The marginal distributions w∆τ3(x) and
w∆θ3(x) can be modeled arbitrarily, as they have no effect
on r(δ) since |∆τ | ≥ ∆τ1 eliminates correlation with the
authentic signal.
IV. MEASUREMENT MODELS
This section develops models for the two observations
that constitute the interference detection statistic, namely, the
received power measurement and the symmetric difference
measurement.
A. Received Power Measurement
The total received power measured by a GNSS receiver in an
RF band of interest, denoted Pk for measurement time tk, is a
simple and effective indicator of interference [20], [39]. Even
subtle spoofing attacks with power advantage η near unity can
cause an increase in Pk that is distinguishable from random
variations, including so-called nulling attacks that attempt to
suppress the authentic signals [31]. The catch is that routine
events such as solar radio bursts and the near passage of a
so-called personal privacy device can also cause Pk to rise
above nominal levels [31]. Thus, to prevent an anomalous-
power monitor from issuing alarms intolerably often, the alarm
threshold may need to be raised to a point where the monitor
is no longer sensitive to subtle spoofing attacks. This is
why power monitoring is best coupled with other forms of
interference monitoring.
Suppose Ms + 1 authentic signals modeled as (1) are
received, each with its associated interference signal, modeled
as (2). Let rAi(t) and rIi(t) represent the ith authentic and
interference signals. The combined signal exiting the RF front
end is then
rC(t) =
Ms∑
i=0
[rAi(t) + rIi(t)] +N(t) (7)
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Fig. 3: Normalized power spectral density about the GPS L1
C/A center frequency (1575.42 MHz) for a static receiver
platform during nominal conditions in a clean RF environment
(dark gray), and during a spoofing attack (light gray). The
two spectra are superimposed so that, of the spoofing attack
spectrum, only the excess power beyond nominal is visible.
The inner two vertical lines represent the 2-MHz bandwidth
about L1, the outer two the 8-MHz bandwidth. The spoofing
attack spectrum applies at tk = 130 seconds into scenario 7
of the Texas Spoofing Test Battery (TEXBAT tb7), described
in [28].
where N(t) is the same thermal noise component as in (3).
Receivers with sufficient dynamic range in the discrete
samples produced from rC(t) do not require an AGC and
so can compute received power directly by averaging the
squared modulus of these samples. Let WP be the bandwidth
over which Pk is to be measured. If WP is narrower than
the receiver front-end’s native bandwidth, then rC(t) must be
filtered to isolate the desired spectral interval. Fig. 3 shows 2-
and 8-MHz bands for Pk, with Fig. 4 showing corresponding
power time histories. In a receiver whose front end is equipped
with an AGC, Pk is measured indirectly through the AGC
setpoint [20]. In this case WP is equivalent to the front-end
noise-equivalent bandwith.
Let r˜C(t) represent the (optionally) filtered version of rC(t)
from which Pk is to be measured. Pk is calculated as the
average power in r˜C(t) over the interval tk−1 to tk:
Pk (dBW) ! 10 log10
(
1
T
∫ tk
tk−1
|r˜C(t)|2dt
)
(8)
Let pPk(x|θ) be the conditional density of Pk. Assuming
WP is wide enough that r˜C(t) retains the significant power
in rAi(t) and rIi(t), then pPk(x|θ) can be modeled as Gaus-
sian, i.e., pPk(x|θ) = N (x; P¯k,σ2P ), where P¯k and σP are
expressed in dBW. The mean, P¯k, revealed by carrying out
the multiplications inherent in |r˜C(t)|2 = r˜C(t)r˜∗C(t), and
by noting that N(t) is zero-mean and independent of rAi(t)
and rIi(t), and that, due orthogonality of spreading codes,
E[rAi(t)r∗Ai(t)] = E[rIi(t)r
∗
Il(t)] = 0 for all i ̸= l, is
P¯k = 10 log10(P¯L), where
P¯L =
Ms∑
i=0
[(1 + ηi)PAi + 2
√
ηiPAi cos(∆θi)R(∆τi)] (9)
+N0WP
and the subscript i associates the corresponding quantity with
the ith signal. The first term in the summation is the non-
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Fig. 4: Time histories of measured received power Pk for the
nominal scenario (top) and spoofing scenario (bottom) whose
spectra are shown in Fig. 3. Black traces correspond to the
2-MHz bandwith and gray traces to the 8-MHz bandwidth
centered at L1. The averaging interval for each measurement
is 200 ms. Pk has been normalized to 0 dB at tk = 0. The 130-
second mark noted in the bottom panel is the instant at which
the spoofing attack spectrum in Fig. 3 applies. At this point in
the attack, ηi ≈ 4, ∆θi ≈ π, and ∆τi ≈ 0 for i = 0, ...,Ms.
coherent sum of power in rAi and rIi; the second term is the
power contributed by coherent interaction between rAi and rIi.
If ηi = 0, or if the interference is orthogonal to the authentic
signal (e.g., ∆θi = ±π/2), or if ∆τi is large enough that
R(∆τi) = 0, then this second term vanishes.
The deviation σP about P¯k accounts for unpredictable but
natural variations in Pk such as measurement error due to the
finite duration over which Pk is estimated. From the top plot
of Fig. 4, one can see that for the receiver under test, σP
is at approximately 0.1 dB and 0.05 dB, respectively, for 2-
and 8-MHz bandwidths. For urban RF environments, in which
significant low-level interference is present in the GNSS bands,
σP can be as high as 0.5 dB in a 2-MHz bandwidth. This
paper’s detection test assumes σP = 0.4 dB.
For modeling completeness, the multi-access interference
M(t) in (3) can be interpreted in terms of the model for rC(t)
in (7). M(t) models the effect of multi-access interference
for a particular desired signal, rA(t). Invoking the so-called
thermal-noise approximation [31], M(t) is assumed to be
spectrally flat with density M0, whose variable value is a
function of the spreading code’s chip interval, τc, and of the
average power P¯M and number Ms of multi-access signals.
For GNSS signals with a sinc2(fτc)-shaped power spectrum,
which applies for all GPS signals except the new military M-
code signals, M0 is given by [31]
M0 = (2/3)MsP¯Mτc (10)
Three example cases for P¯M are given below. In each case,
i = 0 indicates the desired authentic signal and its interferer,
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whereas i = 1, ...,Ms indicate multi-access signals and their
interferers.
P¯M = PA: In this case, PAi = PA for i = 0, ...,Ms and ηi =
0 for i = 1, ...,Ms. In other words, PA is assumed to be
typical of the received power from all GNSS signals and no
other interference besides rI0 is assumed. This case applies
for H0, for H1 when only a single signal, rA0, experiences
significant multipath, and for H2 when the spoofing attack
targets only rA0, as opposed to an attack against all rAi.
P¯M = (1+ η)PA: In this case, PAi = PA and ηi = η for i =
0, ...,Ms. In other words, each of theMs+1 received signals
is modeled as having power PA, and each is assumed to be
subject to a non-coherent interferer with power ηPA. This
case applies for the jamming hypothesis H3, as follows: For
all i, |∆τi| is assumed to be large enough that R(∆τi) = 0,
causing the second term of the summation in (9) to vanish.
Jamming power manifests in the first term of the summation
as an additional ηiPAi = ηPA.
This case also applies forH2 when the spoofing-to-authentic
phase difference ∆θi for i = 0, ...,Ms can be modeled as a
random variable uniformly distributed on [0, 2π), in which
case the second term of the summation in (9) vanishes for
all i.
P¯M = (1+η)PA+2
√
ηPA cos(∆θ)R(∆τ): This case applies
for H2 when the spoofing attack targets not only rA0 but
also the Ms multi-access signals such that ηiPAi = ηPA,
∆θi = ∆θ and ∆τi = ∆τ for i = 0, ...,Ms.
B. Symmetric Difference Measurement
A variety of signal quality monitoring (SQM) metrics
have been applied to detect distortions in ξk(τ) caused by
anomalous GNSS signals, including spoofing signals [21],
[22], [40]–[44]. Among these, the so-called symmetric dif-
ference is particularly attractive for multipath and spoofing
detection because it is simple to implement, is insensitive
to the particular shape of the correlation function (provided
the function is symmetric about τ = 0, as is the case for
all current and proposed GNSS signals), and is sensitive
to the correlation function distortion introduced by spoofing
whenever the authentic and spoofing signals are approximately
matched in power (i.e., 0.1 < η < 10). Fig. 5 illustrates ξk(τ)
under nominal conditions (top) and a spoofing attack (bottom).
Let τd be the offset of the early and late symmetric
difference taps from τ = 0, and let σN0 be the value of
σN in the interference-free case, for which we assume M0
is given by (10) with P¯M = PA. Then at measurement time
tk the symmetric difference is calculated as the modulus of
the complex difference between the early and late symmetric
difference taps, scaled by 1/σN0:
Dk(τd) !
|ξk(−τd)− ξk(τd)|
σN0
(11)
As with Pk, a statistical model for Dk(τd) is necessary
to develop a Bayesian detection framework. Let pDk(x|θ)
denote the conditional density of Dk. An analytical model
for pDk(x|θ) is easily derived when there is no coherent
interaction between rA and rI, that is, when the second
term of the summation in (9) vanishes, which occurs in the
interference-free case (η = 0) or in the case of jamming, for
which R(∆τ) = 0. Let PH0 denote the received power when
η = 0, which, as evident in the top panel of Fig. 4, is constant
to within a few tenths of a dB. Assume that, for any r(t) and
any k ∈ {1, 2, ...}, the AGC adjusts βk such that the average
power in βkr(t) over tk−1 to tk is PH0 . Then, if code tracking
is accurate (∆τAk ≈ 0), as would be true for up to moderate
jamming, or if the amplitude of ξA is small with respect to σN,
as would be true for strong jamming, then the scaled complex
difference [ξk(−τd)− ξk(τd)]/σN0 can be modeled as a zero-
mean complex Gaussian random variable with variance
σ2d = 8τd
(
βkσN
σN0
)2
(12)
It follows that pDk(x|θ) in this case is Rayleigh with scale
parameter σ2d:
pDk(x|θ) =
x
σ2d
exp
(−x2
2σ2d
)
, x ≥ 0 (13)
In the interference-free case, βk = 1 and σN = σN0, so
σ2d reduces to σ
2
d = 8τd. One can show that this simplified
expression for σ2d is also approximately true for wideband
jamming, for which the AGC maintains (βkσN/σN0)2 ≈ 1.
However, the structured-signal jamming assumed in this paper
is more potent than wideband jamming: it increases M0,
and therefore σN, more than equivalently-powered wideband
jamming [31]. As a result, σ2d rises with increasing power
of structured-signal jamming, making it more difficult to
distinguish jamming from spoofing. Nevertheless, assuming
structured-signal jamming, as opposed to the less potent wide-
band or narrowband jamming, is consonant with this paper’s
focus on worst-case attacks.
Note that a version of the symmetric difference normalized
by the maximum magnitude of ξk(τ) has also been proposed
for SQM and spoofing detection [23], [40], [41]. But the
definition of Dk in (11) is more convenient because its
distribution for η = 0 depends only on σd, as evident in (13).
Modeling pDk(x|θ) as Rayleigh only holds for η = 0
or R(∆τ) = 0. When neither of these conditions is true,
the real and imaginary components of ξk(τ) can manifest
strong asymmetry, as shown in the bottom panel of Fig. 5.
In this case, the possible interactions of ξIk(τ), and ξAk(τ)
are so complex that pDk(x|θ) cannot be modeled analytically.
It can, however, be studied through Monte-Carlo simulation
of (5) and (11) as a function of θ = [η,∆τ,∆θ]T and τd,
together with some assumed recipe for determination of τˆ ,
the receiver’s estimate of τA. For this paper, we have assumed
that
τˆ = argmax
τ
|ξk(τ)| (14)
which holds for early-minus-late DLL tracking (both coherent
and non-coherent) in the limit as τDLL → 0, provided the
tracking points have not settled on a local maximum different
from the global maximum. Note that to minimize the number
of correlation taps, one can choose τDLL = τd, where τDLL is
the offset from τ = 0 of the DLL’s early and late taps. But,
depending on the shape of ξk(τ) and the assumed distribution
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Fig. 5: In-phase R{ξk(τ)} and quadrature I{ξk(τ)} compo-
nents of the empirical correlation function ξk(τ) for a clean
scenario (top) and for a spoofing scenario (bottom). The early
and late taps used for tracking [ξk(−τDLL) and ξk(τDLL);
marked with "] and for the symmetric difference measurement
[ξk(−τd) and ξk(τd); marked with △] are not necessarily the
same. The nominal case (top) exhibits symmetry about τ = 0
in both components, whereas the spoofed case (bottom) shows
distortion and strong asymmetry in both components. Samples
of the signal r(t) have been scaled such that |ξk(0)| = 1 for
the nominal case.
of τI, unequal τDLL and τd may improve tracking and detection
performance.
In simulation, one can apply whatever algorithm for pro-
ducing τˆ best approximates the operation of the receiver, or
class of receivers, whose reaction to interference one wishes
to simulate. For example, a multipath-mitigating receiver may
estimate τA by (1) assuming the presence of one or more
multipath components, (2) estimating the parameters η, τI and
θI for each component, and (3) subtracting a model of each
component from ξk(τ) [45].
C. Combined Measurement Vector
The symmetric difference for tracking channel i ∈
{1, 2, ..., N} at time tk, denoted Dik(τd), can be combined
with the received power measurement to form a channel-
specific vector of observables at tk:
zik = [D
i
k(τd), Pk]
T
Dik(τd) and Pk are modeled as independent so that
p(zik|θ) = pDk(zi1k|θ)pPk(zi2k|θ)
where zijk is the jth element of z
i
k.
Obviously, when multiple GNSS signals are simultaneously
affected by interference, detection performance improves by
considering the multi-channel observation vector
z(1:N)k = [D
1
k(τd), D
2
k(τd), . . . , D
N
k (τd), Pk]
T (15)
For clarity of presentation and analysis, the channel-specific
vector zik has been taken as the observation vector for this
paper’s Bayesian detection strategy, with the superscript i
dropped for notational simplicity. Extension of this paper’s
methods to the multi-channel case follows straightforwardly
from the principles of the per-channel test along with a model
for correlation between the Dik(τd).
V. THE POWER-DISTORTION TRADEOFF UNDER SPOOFING
The foregoing measurement models allow one to appreciate
the power-distortion tradeoff that a spoofer faces when mount-
ing an attack. In a typical attack, an admixture of spoofing
and authentic signals is incident on the receiver’s antenna. If
the spoofing and authentic signals are approximately matched
in power (i.e., 0.1 < η < 10), then the correlation function
will be significantly distorted, as shown in the lower panel of
Fig. 5. The spoofer has several options for reducing this telltale
distortion, but the alternatives are either intrinsically difficult,
lead to anomalously high received power, or preclude effective
capture, as described below.
A. Nulling or Blocking
A spoofer can minimize the hallmark distortions of an
attack by generating an antipodal, or nulling, signal or by
preventing reception of the authentic signal (e.g., by emplacing
an obstruction). The form given for rI(t) in (2) accommodates
a nulling attack in which rI(t) is made antipodal to rA(t) via
the following settings: η = 1, τI = τA, and θI = θA + π.
This attack annihilates rA(t), producing an effect similar to
jamming but with much less received power. But the form in
(2) does not accommodate the nulling-and-replacement attack
described in [6] and [31], whereby, after nulling rA(t), the
attacker supplants it with a separate spoofing signal. Detection
of a perfectly-executed nulling-and-replacement attack is, in
fact, not possible with the technique developed in this paper.
Such an attack is, however, extremely difficult to carry out
in practice, as it requires centimeter-level knowledge of, and
a highly accurate fading model for, the attacker-to-receiver
signal path.
Similarly, blocking reception of rA(t) by physical obstruc-
tion is difficult in cases where the receiver antenna is not physi-
cally accessible to the attacker. The technique developed in this
paper makes the assumption that a nulling-and-replacement
attack is impractically difficult and that physical access to the
receiving antenna is controlled to prevent signal blockage. It
must be recognized, however, that in many cases of practical
interest (e.g., fishing vessel monitoring), the receiver and
antenna are fully under the control of potential attackers.
B. Overpowering
An alternative approach to eliminating telltale distortion is
an overpowered spoofing attack in which η is set so high that
the receiver’s AGC squelches the relatively weak authentic
signals below the noise floor, thereby eliminating interaction
between rI and rA. In other words, as η increases, βk decreases
to maintain a constant power in βkr(t), with the result that
WESSON et al.: SPOOFING DETECTION 9
βkrA(t) becomes negligible compared to βkrI(t). If, however,
the receiver raises an alarm when the received power Pk
exceeds some threshold, then covert spoofing is strictly limited
to η < ηmax for some ηmax.
C. Underpowering
The spoofer can also minimize correlation function distor-
tion by selecting a small η. However, reliable capture of the
receiver’s tracking loops requires η > ηmin ≈ 0.4 dB [46].
Thus, for spoofing to be both reliable and covert, η is lower
bounded by ηmin and upper bounded by ηmax.
This paper’s approach to spoofing detection can be stated as
follows: If the defending receiver is designed such that ηmax
is sufficiently low despite maintaining a tolerable rate of false
alarm in the received power monitor, then a carry-off spoofing
attack that respects this bound yet successfully captures the
receiver’s tracking loops will unavoidably and detectably dis-
tort the correlation function ξk(τ). This distortion, evident in
Dk(τd), can be distinguished from distortion due to multipath
by its greater magnitude and by a concomitant increase in Pk.
VI. DECISION RULE
Finding the decision rule δ(zk) from (6) that minimizes
the Bayes risk r(δ) is conceptually straightforward. One can
express r(δ) as
r(δ) = E{C[δ(Zk),Θ]} = E{E{C[δ(Zk),Θ]|Zk}} (16)
where the second equality follows from the rule of iterated
expectations. We note from (16) that, whatever the distribution
of Zk, r(δ) is minimized when, for each zk ∈ Γ, δ is chosen to
minimize the posterior cost E{C[δ(Zk),Θ]|Zk = zk}. Thus,
the Bayes-optimal rule is given by
δB(zk) = argmin
i∈I
E{C[i,Θ]|Zk = zk} (17)
which, because the parameter sets Λi are disjoint, can be
written
δB(zk) = argmin
i∈I
3∑
j=0
∫
Λj
C[i, θ]p(θ|zk)dθ (18)
Reversing the conditioning of p(θ|zk) using Bayes’s formula,
and recognizing that w(θ) =
∑3
j=0 wj(θ)πj , we obtain
δB(zk) = argmin
i∈I
3∑
j=0
πj
∫
Λj
C[i, θ]p(zk|θ)wj(θ)dθ (19)
The foregoing sections defined the parameter sets Λi and
presented analytical models for the conditional densities wi(θ),
i ∈ I. If an analytical model for p(zk|θ) were also available,
then (19) could be solved by numerical integration. Unfortu-
nately, finding an analytical model for p(zk|θ) only appears
possible for the special cases of η = 0 or R(∆τ) = 0. On
the other hand, for a given θ, it is easy to simulate samples
drawn from p(zk|θ) by taking the nonlinear and stochastic
models described in Sections II and IV as recipes for a sample
simulator. In view of this, a Monte-Carlo technique can be
applied to find δB(zk), as follows.
1) For each i ∈ I, Ni parameter vectors are simulated
according to the distribution wi(θ), where Ni/NP ≈ πi
and NP =
∑
i∈I Ni. The lth simulated vector drawn
from wi(θ) is denoted θli.
2) For each θli, NM simulated measurements zk are gener-
ated. Dropping the time index k from zk for notational
clarity, themth simulated measurement, given θli, is writ-
ten zmli. The total number of measurements simulated
is NPNM. Fig. 6 shows an example realization of this
sample generation process over a relevant range for Dk
and Pk.
3) The two-dimensional observation space Γ is divided into
a large number of small rectangular cells of uniform size.
Each cell is assumed to belong to a single decision region
such that all observation samples falling within a cell
belonging to Γi are assigned to hypothesis Hi, i ∈ I. An
initial partition of Γ is created by assigning each cell to
the hypothesis Hi having the largest number of samples
zmli within the cell. Boundaries are adjusted such that
each decision region Γi is simply connected (no islands),
a condition that can reasonably be assumed from the fact
that C[i, θ], p(zk|θ), and wi(θ) are smooth in θ.
4) The Bayes risk for the current partition is calculated as
r(δ) =
1
NPNM
3∑
i=0
Ni∑
l=1
NM∑
m=1
C[δ(zmli), θli] (20)
A new decision region assignment is considered for each
cell lying along the boundary between decision regions.
The new assignment is retained whenever it reduces r(δ),
provided the resulting decision regions remain simply
connected. The process is repeated until no boundary cells
warrant re-assigning, at which point the cell assignments
constitute the final decision regions Γi, i ∈ I. Fig. 7
shows an example of the decision regions created by this
process.
Two different types of cost function C[i, θ] are considered,
as follows.
A. Uniform Cost within each Λj
When C[i, θ] is uniform across all θ ∈ Λj , we write Cij ,
interpreted as the cost of choosing Hi when Hj is true.
The simplest such cost evenly penalizes misclassification: if
i = j, then Cij = 0; otherwise, Cij = 1. But in the context
of navigation security, not all types of misclassification are
equally costly. We propose the following cost assignment:
Cii = 0, i ∈ I: Correct decision
C01 = 0.2: Low cost: Some multipath-induced code- and
carrier- phase error might have been mitigated via receiver’s
multipath mitigation routines had multipath been detected,
but otherwise harmless.
C02 = C12 = 1: Highest cost: Spoofing goes undetected;
receiver may report hazardously misleading information.
Multipath mitigation applied by a receiver deciding H1
cannot be assumed to reduce this cost.
C03 = C13 = 0.9: High cost: Jamming goes undetected;
receiver may report hazardously misleading information.
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Fig. 6: Simulated observations zk = [Dk(τd), Pk]T for no
interference (green), multipath (black), spoofing (red), and
jamming (blue) based on the Monte-Carlo simulation tech-
nique described in the text, with NP = 105, NM = 20,π0 =
0.6,π1 = 0.2,π2 = 0.05, π3 = 0.15, σP = 0.4 dB,
PA = −156 dBW, N0 = −204 dBW/Hz, Ms = 7, τd = 0.15
chips, T = 100 ms, WP = 2 MHz, and with P¯M = PA for
H0 and H1, P¯M = (1 + η)PA + 2
√
ηPA cos(∆θ)R(∆τ) for
H2, and P¯M = (1 + η)PA for H3. Note that the spoofing
samples are concentrated along a low-power band because the
distribution w2(θ) assumes stealthy spoofing that attempts to
masquerade as multipath.
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Fig. 7: Optimum decision regions for the θ-dependent cost
C[i, θ]: Γ0 (no interference, green), Γ1 (multipath, black), Γ2
(spoofing, red), and Γ3 (jamming, blue).
Not so costly as C02 because a jammer has less control
over receiver output than a spoofer.
C10 = 0.1: Low cost: Receiver may waste computational
resources trying to mitigate phantom multipath, and runs
a chance of slightly biasing code and carrier measurements
in the process, but otherwise harmless.
C20 = C21 = C30 = C31 = 0.4: Moderate cost: A false
alarm for jamming or spoofing is raised, breaking navigation
solution continuity.
C32 = C23 = 0.2: Low cost: Although spoofing is misclas-
sified as jamming or vice-versa, no hazardously misleading
information is issued, as the receiver suppresses its naviga-
tion solution when it decides H2 or H3.
B. θ-Dependent Cost
The harm to a GNSS receiver and its dependent systems or
users may not be uniform across all θ ∈ Λi for a given Λi ⊂
Λ, i ∈ I. It is therefore worthwhile to consider the full θ-
dependent cost C[i, θ]. Our approach begins with the uniform
cost assignment described above, substituting C[i, θ], θ ∈ Λj
for certain elements Cij , as follows:
C[0, θ ∈ Λ1] = min[0.8, eτ(θ)/0.3]: Not all multipath
is equally harmful: Cost is assumed to increase linearly
with the magnitude of multipath-induced code-phase error
eτ (θ) ! |τˆ(θ) − τA|, expressed in chips of length τc, up to
a saturation value of 0.8, where τˆ (θ) is given by (14) and
min[x, y] is the minimum of x and y.
C[0, θ ∈ Λ2] = C[0, θ ∈ Λ1] and C[1, θ ∈ Λ2] = 0 if ∆τ <
τDLL and η < −1 dB; otherwise, C[0, θ ∈ Λ2] = C02
and C[1, θ ∈ Λ2] = C12, where τDLL is the offset of the
correlation taps used for tracking (marked with " in Fig. 5):
Close-in, weak spoofing is no more harmful than multipath,
and can be treated accordingly.
C[0, θ ∈ Λ3] = C[1, θ ∈ Λ3] = min[C03, η/10]: The cost of
jamming is assumed to increase linearly with η (in dB) up
to saturation at C03.
C. Prior Probabilities
The prior probabilities πi, i ∈ I, are of course situation-
dependent. One may wish to increase π2, for example, upon
entering an area where spoofers have historically been active.
Values of πi, i ∈ I were chosen as follows to represent a
heightened threat scenario. Approximate relative values for
π0,π1, and π3 were first found by a manual epoch-by-epoch
classification of data from a mobile GPS receiver in an urban
environment, which exhibited significant multipath and mild
jamming but no spoofing. A low but significant prior proba-
bility of spoofing was assumed, and the empirical π1 and π3
values were slightly inflated. All values were then normalized
such that
∑
i∈I πi = 1. The resulting values, assumed for the
remainder of the paper, were π0 = 0.6,π1 = 0.2,π2 = 0.05
and π3 = 0.15.
D. Application of the Decision Rule
The PD detector’s Bayes-optimal decision rule δB for
classifying received GNSS signals based on observations
zk = [Dk(τd), Pk]T , priors πi, densities wi(θ), p(zk|θ), and
the θ-dependent cost C[i, θ], all as described previously, and
with parameter values as indicated in the caption of Fig. 6, is
embodied in the colored regions shown in Fig. 7.
Application of the decision rule is straightforward: If the
observation zjk, taken at time tk from tracking channel j, falls
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in decision region Γi, it is assigned to hypothesis Hi. Table I
shows classification statistics as evaluated by applying the rule
to an independent set of Monte-Carlo-generated observations
like the one shown in Fig. 6. The table reveals that δB tends
to misclassify multipath as H0, a consequence of the low cost
C[0, θ ∈ Λ1], especially when multipath is benign, as is often
the case. Multipath is misclassified as spoofing less than 1.7%
of the time even though the modeled w2(θ) is unfavorable for
distinguishing H2 from H1.
One can achieve a lower spoofing false alarm rate by consid-
ering a set of channel-specific decisions over time {δB(zjk)|k ∈
K} for some set K of contiguous sample times. This approach
is effective because a spoofing attack must proceed slowly
enough to capture the receiver tracking loops, which offers
a window of several seconds over which {δB(zjk)|k ∈ K}
will include many declarations of H2, whereas, under H1,
only a small number of such declarations would arise. One
may also lower the spoofing false alarm rate by considering
multi-channel decisions {δB(zjk)|j = 1, 2, ..., N}, or the full
combined observation in (15). When applying multi-channel
tests, one must bear in mind that a spoofer may not attack
all channels simultaneously. However, any spoofer wishing
to evade simple RAIM-type alarms must produce a self-
consistent signal ensemble [47], which requires spoofing more
than N − Nm signals, where N is the total number of
independent signals being tracked, and Nm (typically 4) is the
minimum number required for a position and time solution.
TABLE I: Simulation-evaluated classification matrix for the
decision regions in Fig. 7. The table’s (i, j)th element is the
relative frequency with which the detector chose i when j was
the true scenario.
Decision True Scenario
H0 H1 H2 H3
H0 0.9942 0.8809 0.06244 0.0184
H1 0.0005 0.0987 0.0234 0
H2 0.0001 0.0162 0.8698 0.0017
H3 0.0039 0.0028 0.0442 0.9799
VII. EXPERIMENTAL DATA
An independent evaluation of the PD detector was carried
out against 27 empirical GNSS data recordings, including 6
recordings of various spoofing scenarios, 14 multipath-dense
scenarios, 4 jamming scenarios of different power levels, and
3 scenarios exhibiting negligible interference beyond thermal
and multi-access noise. Table II provides a summary descrip-
tion of each recording.
A. TEXBAT
The Texas Spoofing Test Battery (TEXBAT), version 1.1,
from which cd0 and tb2–tb7 are drawn, is a public set
of high-fidelity digital recordings of spoofing attacks against
civil GPS L1 C/A signals [26]–[28]. Both static and dynamic
scenarios are provided along with their corresponding un-
spoofed recording. Each 16-bit quantized recording is centered
at 1575.42 MHz with a bandwidth of 20 MHz and a complex
sampling rate of 25 Msps. Each spoofing scenario makes use
of the most advanced civil GPS spoofer publicly disclosed
[3], [48]. In the laboratory, the spoofer can precisely control
η,∆τ , and ∆θ, and can generate self-consistent and aligned
navigation data bits.
Note that tb2–tb6 exhibit a modest amount of quantiza-
tion and aliasing noise that makes them easier to detect than
would be expected based on this paper’s models, whereas tb7
is free from such extraneous noise. tb7 is also special in
that the spoofer exercises control of ∆θ, permitting nulling,
as described in Section V-A, in the early stages of the attack.
In all other TEXBAT recordings, the spoofer controlled η and
∆τ but left ∆θ at an arbitrary constant value (tb3, tb4, and
tb6) or allowed it to ramp consistent with the pull-off rate
(tb2 and tb5).
B. RNL Multipath and Interference Recordings
This public set of GNSS recordings, from which wd0–wd12
and sm1–sm3 are drawn, exhibits mild-to-severe multipath
and mild unintentional jamming [29], [30]. Static and dynamic
scenarios are included in both light and dense urban environ-
ments around Austin, TX. Each 16-bit quantized recording is
centered at 1575.42 MHz with a bandwidth of 10 MHz and
at a complex sampling rate of 12.5 Msps.
C. Intentional Jamming Recordings
Jamming scenarios jd1–jd4 were recorded using a per-
sonal privacy device generating a sawtooth interference wave-
form with a sweep range of 1550.02–1606.72MHz and sweep
period of 26 µs (see [49], Table 1, Row 1 and Fig. 8.). This
device typifies low-cost jammers that can be purchased online
and easily operated, albeit illegally. The jamming interference
was combined with clean, static receiver data from a rooftop
antenna and re-recorded. Each 16-bit quantized recording was
centered at 1575.42 MHz with a bandwidth of 10 MHz and
at a complex sampling rate of 12.5 Msps.
D. Clean Recordings
Three recordings (cd0, wd0, and wd1), with negligible
interference beyond thermal noise and multi-access interfer-
ence, were selected from the TEXBAT and RNL Multipath
and Interference Recordings data sets. These were all static
data sets in quiet RF environments with little multipath.
E. Pre-Processing
Raw wideband complex samples were first processed by
the GRID science-grade software-defined receiver [50] to
produce 100-Hz complex accumulations free of navigation
data modulation at 41 uniformly-spaced taps spanning the
range [−τc, τc] around the prompt tap (τ = 0). From the
resulting data-free 100-Hz accumulations, the nominal ther-
mal noise deviation σN0 needed to form Dk in (11) was
estimated by taking a complex-accumulation-wise standard
deviation across multiple channels and multiple correlation
tap offsets over a 15 second period in each recording that
was substantially free from interference. Blocks of 10 100-Hz
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TABLE II: Summary of 27 data recordings used for experi-
mental evaluation.
Type ID Description Duration (s)
H0 cd0 static rooftop 456
H0 wd0 static open field 304
H0 wd1 static open field 298
H1 wd2 dynamic deep urban 298
H1 wd3 dynamic deep urban 456
H1 wd4 dynamic deep urban 292
H1 wd5 dynamic deep urban 292
H1 wd6 dynamic deep urban 460
H1 wd7 dynamic deep urban 246
H1 wd8 dynamic deep urban 278
H1 wd9 dynamic deep urban 334
H1 wd10 dynamic deep urban 370
H1 wd11 dynamic deep urban 390
H1 wd12 dynamic deep urban 390
H1 sm1 static urban 1700
H1 sm2 static urban 600
H1 sm3 static urban 150
H2 tb2 static time push, η = 10 dB 346
H2 tb3 static time push, η = 1.3 dB 336
H2 tb4 static pos. push, η = 0.4 dB 336
H2 tb5 dynamic pos. push, η = 9.9 dB 304
H2 tb6 static time push, η = 0.8 dB 308
H2 tb7 static time push, ∆θ control 468
H3 jd1 PPD, η = 18 dB 108
H3 jd2 PPD, η = 7 dB 58
H3 jd3 PPD, η = 8 dB 108
H3 jd4 PPD, η = 2 dB 108
complex accumulations were then averaged to create 10-Hz
accumulations, at each of the 41 code phase offsets. These
10-Hz complex accumulations are those modeled by ξk(τ) in
Fig. 1.
Received power was calculated directly from the raw wide-
band (e.g., 25 Msps) complex samples by filtering to a band-
width WP of 2 MHz, as in Fig. 3, then averaging the squared
modulus of the filtered samples over 200 ms to produce a 5-
Hz time history of received power. This was aligned in time
with the ξk(τ) and interpolated to produce a corresponding
10-Hz Pk.
Naturally-occurring low-level (less than 2 dB) unintentional
jamming was present in many of the type-H1 (multipath) data
recordings taken in urban settings. Fig. 8 shows an example Pk
time history exhibiting such jamming as intermittent spikes.
The short data intervals containing these spikes were excised
from these recordings to ensure they exhibited only multipath
and thermal noise. Otherwise, the PD detector would classify
the type-H1 recordings as a mixture of multipath and jam-
ming, which, although true, would complicate an analysis of
misclassification using the empirical data. As shown in the
bottom panel of Fig. 8, the cumulative distribution of power
for each data set was used to identify the distribution tail, at
whose boundary the excision threshold was set.
VIII. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
This section documents the experimental performance as-
sessment of the PD detector, when applying the decision
regions shown in Fig. 7, against the 27 recordings listed in
Table II. Because tb7 is a special case that violates the
PD detector’s assumption against nulling, it will be treated
separately in the discussion below.
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Fig. 8: Top: Time history of received power measurements
Pk for data set sm2. Power spikes indicate the presence of
low-level unintentional jamming. Bottom: The inflection point
of the empirical cumulative distribution function (CDF) was
taken as the threshold above which the empirical data were
deemed to be of type H3 (jamming) instead of type H1
(multipath), and so excised from the recording.
P
k
(d
B
)
Dk
Fig. 9: Observations zk = [Dk, Pk]T for clean (green),
multipath (black), spoofing (red), and jamming (blue) from
the experimental recordings.
Observations zk from the experimental recordings (sans
tb7) are shown in Fig. 9. Clearly, the simulated observations
in Fig. 6 agree well with the empirical ones. The abrupt upper
boundary of the multipath samples is due to the thresholding
discussed in connection with Fig. 8.
Fig. 10 shows a single-channel cumulative time history of
the PD detector’s decisions for example jamming (top panel)
and spoofing (bottom panel) attack scenarios. In the jamming
scenario, the attack is detected immediately at onset, and
continuously declared so thereafter. In the spoofing scenario,
the attack is detected immediately, but initially classified as
WESSON et al.: SPOOFING DETECTION 13
50 100 150 200
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
H3
H0
H0
tk (sec)
H3
H2
H1, H2
H1
Fig. 10: Cumulative time history of decisions δB(zk) for a
single receiver tracking channel. Each trace represents the total
number of times the corresponding hypothesis was chosen up
to time tk, normalized so that the final cumulative values sum
to one. Both attacks begin at 120 seconds. Top: Jamming sce-
nario jd3. Bottom: Spoofing scenario tb4 with the detector
applied to a mid-elevation satellite signal.
jamming because the spoofer’s near-perfect initial code-phase
alignment (∆τ ≈ 0) causes little distortion (and, indeed, little
harm to the receiver). At about 180 seconds, the spoofer be-
gins its pull-off, whereupon the increased correlation function
distortion reveals the attack as spoofing. After tk = 300, the
pull-off has proceeded far enough that correlation function
distortion is less pronounced and the attack is declared to be
jamming again. It is notable that the spoofing attack is caught
despite its low power advantage, which was η = 0.4 dB as
intended, but ∼ 1.5 dB in effect due to quantization noise in
the spoofer.
Table III summarizes the PD detector’s overall performance
against the experimental data in terms of classification statis-
tics. Importantly, all instances of spoofing and jamming were
flagged as attacks. However, whereas jamming was always
categorized correctly, spoofing was declared to be jamming
4/5 of the time, much higher than the simulated-data spoofing-
to-jamming misclassification rate presented in Table I. The
difference is that the experimental attacks all begin initially
code-phase aligned (∆τ ≈ 0) and so do not initially cause
harm or significant distortion. Moreover, as pull-off proceeds
and ∆θ exceeds τc, distortion subsides, becoming negligible
beyond 2τc, whereupon the spoofing is either classified as
H0 (if low-power) or H3 (if high-power). Thus, the PD
detector is most effective at recognizing spoofing as such
during initial carry-off of the tracking points. Conveniently,
this is precisely when (1) carry-off-type spoofing begins to
be hazardous, and when (2) civil GNSS spoofing detection
strategies based on cryptographic security codes, as in [8], are
least effective. Thus, the PD detector is nicely complementary
with the methods of [8].
A second important result in Table III is the low rate of
false spoofing or jamming alarms. Clean (H0) data produced
no false alarms, and multipath-rich data (H1) produced false
alarms only 0.47% of the time. Thus, for a multi-channel de-
cision, assuming an urban setting with independent multipath
across tracking channels and tk+1 − tk = 100 ms, any subset
of 6 from a total of N ≤ 20 tracking channels would only
simultaneously false alarm on average once every 8.5 years.
TABLE III: As Table I but for the PD detector applied to the
experimental recordings (sans tb7).
Decision True Scenario
H0 H1 H2 H3
H0 0.9998 0.9253 0 0
H1 0.0001 0.0700 0 0
H2 0 0.0047 0.2013 0
H3 0 0 0.7987 1
To test its limits, the PD detector was applied to tb7, an
especially subtle attack in which the spoofer carefully controls
∆θ, effects authentic signal nulling during the initial stages of
the attack, and maintains an approximately constant measured
signal amplitude during pull-off [28]. As explained in Section
V-A, such an attack would be difficult to mount outside the
laboratory. As might be expected, the detector’s performance
was worse for this attack than for the other spoofing attacks: its
decision rates during the attack portion of the recording were
H0: 14%, H1: 10%, H2: 70%, and H3: 6%. Nonetheless, the
attack was caught on each channel soon after pull-off began.
IX. CONCLUSIONS
We presented the PD detector, a novel low-cost, receiver-
autonomous, readily-implementable GNSS jamming and
carry-off spoofing detector. The detector traps a would-be at-
tacker between simultaneous monitoring of received power and
complex correlation function distortion. It amounts to a multi-
hypothesis Bayesian classifier applied to a problem with three
unknown parameters whose prior distributions are informed by
the physics of GNSS signal reception and signal processing,
and whose prior probabilities can be adjusted to reflect the
threat environment in which a receiver operates. In evaluation
against 27 high-quality experimental recordings of attack and
non-attack scenarios, the detector correctly alarmed on all
malicious attacks while maintaining a single-channel false
alarm rate below 0.5%. For convenient implementation, the
PD detector’s decision rule for three different cost functions,
together with all code required to generate application-tailored
decision rules, is available at https://github.com/navSecurity/P-
D-defense.
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